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1INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici curiae are law library associations, individual 
law librarians from county, state, federal, and academic 
law libraries, and professors of law. These many amici 
share a common view that open, equitable, and effective 
access to official legal information is a fundamental right, 
superior to copyright. We also share the lived experience 
of knowing that access to official published law can be 
rendered meaningless if interspersed copyrighted content 
can be used to limit access and use of the whole work. We 
ask the Court to find that if a state publishes binding law 
in a publication it designates as official, as Georgia has 
done here, the official status of that publication should 
override any competing copyright interest in ancillary 
material that might otherwise be protected if included in 
another type of publication.
Amici rely on unrestricted access to the text of the 
official law as designated by the states, including Georgia, 
to give effect to our collective missions of facilitating equal 
and equitable access to legal information, serving legal 
professionals as well as the general public who both govern 
and are governed through the law. See Ryan Metheny, 
Improving Lives by Building Social Capital: A New Way 
to Frame the Work of Law Libraries, 109 Law Libr. J. 631 
(2017). For this mission, we rely on full access and reuse 
of official legal texts for purposes such as conducting and 
supporting legal research and scholarship, teaching legal 
research, and preserving state legal materials. 
1.  Counsel for the parties have consented to this brief. Under 
Rule 37.6, amici affirms that no counsel for any party authored 
this brief in whole or in part, and no person other than amici or its 
counsel made a monetary contribution to fund the preparation or 
submission of this brief.
2While legal professionals and the public rely on 
unrestricted access to the law in order to fulfill their 
legal obligations and participate in democratic self-rule, 
the present amici have a special and vital need for open, 
unencumbered access to the official copies of the law in 
order to fulfill their mission. Claims of copyright asserted 
over official legal texts inhibit our ability to bridge the 
gap for many who need meaningful access to the law by 
imposing artificial cost and use restrictions. Copyright 
can be wielded to control basic library services such as 
reproducing copies for users, or public distribution or 
public display of official copies of the law online for remote 
access. In the face of such restrictions, notwithstanding 
the best efforts of law libraries, our ability to meet the 
needs of the public is compromised. 
As part of our mandate, amici also note that the 
number of pro se patrons interacting with the legal 
system continues to grow rapidly. For many of these pro se 
litigants, who generally do not have any legal aid available 
to them, any additional financial restriction is extremely 
burdensome, including fees to view official law publications 
levied by commercial publishers such as RELX, the parent 
company of the publisher of the Official Code of Georgia 
Annotated (“OCGA”). Law libraries around the United 
States are reporting that the number of these pro se litigants 
requiring access to legal texts is increasing. See American 
Association of Law Libraries, Law Libraries and Access to 
Justice, (July 2014), https://www.aallnet.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/01/AccessToJusticeSpecialCommittee2014 
LawLibrariesAndAccessToJustice.pdf (last visited Sept. 
30, 2019). Those pro se patrons do not have an organization 
to represent them before the court, but given their 
heavy reliance on law libraries for access to the official 
3publications such as the OCGA, we present views that we 
believe are also representative of their needs. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Due process and the rule of law require that the public 
has meaningful access to “the law.” Every major modern 
society since the Greeks has recognized the importance 
of this principle. Roscoe Pound, Theories of the Law, 22 
Yale L.J. 114, 117 (1912). 
In the United States, “the law” largely comes from 
appellate courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies 
who have been granted rule-making authority. As every 
first year law student learns, those law-making bodies 
have developed highly specific methods for communicating 
their pronouncements of law through official publications, 
such as the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (“OCGA”). 
Those specific methods and their resulting official 
publications serve a number of important functions that 
are intrinsic to the underlying purpose of supporting 
democracy and of fair notice of the law. Official publications 
of the law assure the reader of the reliability and currency 
of the text, as well as its acceptance for use in other parts 
of the legal system, such as for citation before a court. 
Access to official publications is also critical for conducting 
and supporting legal scholarship, teaching legal research, 
preserving state legal materials, and providing equal and 
equitable access to legal information. A critical feature 
that enables those uses is that the government has 
identified the publication as holding special weight as an 
official, authoritative source. 
4The major point of this brief is that when a state 
gives official status to a publication containing binding 
legal pronouncements, the contents of the whole of that 
publication must be freely and fully accessible by the 
public. Assertion of copyright over even portions of the 
publication effectively renders access and use of the core 
statutory text meaningless. In addition to the logistical 
difficulties of disentangling binding edicts of law from 
ancillary materials published with it, if the publication 
must be disassembled into its component parts for reuse--
annotations protected and filtered out, while the statutory 
text may be copied--the remaining pieces are no longer 
the “official” publication and unusable for their intended 
purpose. A state should not be allowed to assert the 
broad and powerful coercive rights granted by copyright 
over an official publication of law by interweaving 
clearly uncopyrightable edicts of law with otherwise 
copyrightable ancillary materials, such as annotations. 
Granting copyright protection over even portions of the 
OCGA would harm law librarians and by extension the 
public, while granting a windfall to publishers and states 
who should need no copyright incentive to fulfill their 
constitutional obligation to publish official copies of their 
laws. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the decision 
of the 11th Circuit. 
ARGUMENT
I. PRINCIPLES OF DUE PROCESS AND THE 
RULE OF LAW REQUIRE MEANINGFUL 
PUBLIC ACCESS TO OFFICIAL VERSIONS OF 
“THE LAW”
The U.S. Constitution demands that the public have 
notice of and access to the law. “Every citizen is presumed 
5to know the law thus declared, and it needs no argument to 
show that justice requires that all should have free access 
to the opinions, and that it is against sound public policy 
to prevent this, or to suppress and keep from the earliest 
knowledge of the public the statutes or the decisions and 
opinions of the justices.” Nash v. Lathrop, 6 N.E. 559, 560 
(Mass. 1886). 
Despite “not needing an argument,” courts have 
supported this principle as a basic requirement of due 
process: 
Due process requires people to have notice 
of what the law requires of them so that they 
may obey it and avoid its sanctions. So long as 
the law is generally available for the public to 
examine, then everyone may be considered to 
have constructive notice of it; any failure to 
gain actual notice results from simple lack of 
diligence. But if access to the law is limited, 
then the people will or may be unable to learn of 
its requirements and may be thereby deprived 
of the notice to which due process entitles them. 
Bldg. Officials & Code Adm. v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 
730, 734 (1st Cir. 1980).
While binding edicts of law are a particularly 
important type of legal publication, this court has also 
held in a number of cases, particularly with regard to 
judicial proceedings, but also in other contexts, that 
the public has certain rights to access and use other 
legal documents and related government publications 
as well. This tradition has a long history rooted in the 
6idea of democratic government. See “Letter from James 
Madison to W.T. Barry” (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 Writings 
of James Madison 103 (G. Hunt ed. 1910) (“A popular 
Government, without popular information, or the means 
of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; 
or, perhaps both.”). The basic principle of access is driven 
by the idea that citizens have a right to interact freely 
with the output of their government in order to properly 
govern themselves. For example, “[t]he freedom of the 
press to publish that information appears to us to be of 
critical importance to our type of government in which 
the citizenry is the final judge of the proper conduct of 
public business. In preserving that form of government 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments command nothing 
less than that the States may not impose sanctions on the 
publication of truthful information contained in official 
court records open to public inspection.” Cox Broad. Corp. 
v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975). 
While records such as court documents and other non-
binding legal materials must be freely publishable and 
accessible without threat of liability, much more so is the 
need for the public to access official legal publications that 
are primarily composed of binding law. For law libraries 
in particular, copyright over official publications raises 
the prospect of liability for everything from everyday 
uses such as providing individual copies for lawyers, 
to emerging uses such as digital access through online 
library portals that allow law libraries to bring the text 
of the law to many more users who are homebound, 
disabled, or without resources to travel to a physical law 
library. While law libraries have long served a variety 
of constituencies, their mission has recently emphasized 
a focus on those historically excluded from access to 
7justice. See Am. Ass’n Of Law Libraries, Law Libraries 
and Access To Justice: A Report of the American 
Association of Law Libraries Special Committee on 
Access to Justice (July 2014), http://www.aallnet.org/mm/
Publications/products/atjwhitepaper.pdf. For example, 
although they do not have their own national association, 
prison law libraries play a major role in access to the 
legal system for those who are incarcerated. In fact, 
courts have stated that the “Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees state inmates the 
right to ‘adequate, effective, and meaningful’ access to 
the courts.’” Petrick v. Maynard, 11 F.3d 991, 994 (10th 
Cir. 1993) (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 
(1977)). The guarantee of this court access is satisfied 
“by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or 
adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” 
Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828. The logical prerequisite to this 
guarantee of access is that law libraries themselves must 
be able to provide access to official copies of the law to 
their users. This includes access to related materials such 
as notes, commentary, and other useful annotations that 
are created or commissioned by the government as part 
of the “official” code. Law libraries have long worked to 
overcome the many natural barriers that exist for users 
to access these materials--for example, printing physical 
copies of law books is costly, and access to the internet 
is not free--but requiring law libraries to also tackle 
artificial legal barriers, such as copyright, that are erected 
solely for economic profit is incompatible with the spirit 
and principle of the rule of law and of due process. 
In this case, the state of Georgia seeks the right to 
hold users of the OCGA liable for copyright infringement 
by asserting that because parts of the official publication 
8are copyrighted, copying of the whole of the OCGA is 
impermissible. The Constitutional bar for adequate 
access to the law is not high--legislatures must do 
“nothing more than enact and publish the law,” Texaco, 
Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 532 (1982)--and so states 
are free to adopt a variety of ways to communicate the 
law’s requirements. Indeed, states differ significantly in 
their approach to statutory publications, codifications, 
and the weight and authority they vest with either type 
of publication. However, when a state makes a choice 
to imbue a particular publication with special “official” 
status, authority, and evidentiary weight, it should not also 
be permitted to threaten its citizens and other members 
of the public with serious legal liability when they freely 
reuse that publication, regardless of whether the state 
includes in the publication materials such as annotations, 
that would otherwise be copyrightable if published in 
another publication. 
A.	 Official	versions	of	codes	are	published	under	
the	 authority	 of	 the	 state	 and	 carry	 special	
weight	as	evidence	of	legislative	enactments.
 When a state designates a legal publication as 
“official,” that designation is important, often carrying 
with it significance as a matter of reliability and its use 
as evidence of legislative enactments. As legislation is 
created, copies emanate into the world with a variety 
of legal statuses. The original session law is, in many 
states, viewed as the canonical text--perfect evidence of 
the legislative enactment--while other publications of the 
law, such as an official statutory codification, are afforded 
9their own special evidentiary status.2 Yet other versions, 
such as commercial editions published by an independent 
publisher, or free but unverified electronic copies, carry 
no special evidentiary weight. 
For example, the majority of the subject-based 
codification of the official United States Code is viewed 
by the courts as “prima facie evidence that the provision 
has the force of law.” See United States National Bank of 
Oregon v. Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc. 
508 U.S. 439 (1993); see also 1 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2018). These 
distinctions are a matter of law. See Stephan v. United 
States, 319 U.S. 423 (1969) (stating that “the very meaning 
of ‘prima facie’ is that the Code cannot prevail over the 
Statutes at Large when the two are inconsistent.”).
This issue of what constitutes evidence of “the law” 
has also been litigated at the state level in states like 
Minnesota, Idaho, and Florida with courts in those states 
pointing out that while their codes are not the canonical 
“laws themselves,” they are given special status by 
providing prima facie evidence of it. See State v. Boecker, 
893 N.W.2d 348, 353 (Minn. 2017). See also Peterson v. 
Peterson, 156 Idaho 85, 89-90 (2014); Shuman v. State, 358 
So.2d 1333, 1338 (Fl. 1978). Although the issue has not been 
litigated frequently, at least one state appellate court has 
pointed out the difference in an official legal publication 
versus an unofficial one—in this case, one produced by a 
2.  In some states and for portions of the United States Code, 
legislatures have reenacted statutory codifications as “positive law,” 
transforming those portions of the code from prima facia evidence 
of the law into enacted, perfect fidelity copies of the law itself. See 
Mary Whisner, The United States Code, Prima Facie Evidence, and 
Positive Law, 101 Law Libr. J. 545 (2009).
10
commercial third-party, West Publishing Company—by 
explaining that unofficial statutory compilations do not 
become the official version of the law just by the practice 
of the bar or courts, and thus unofficial codifications are 
not law that should be cited in courts. In re Appeal of 
Tenet HealthSystems Bucks County, LLC, 880 A.2d 721, 
725-726 (Pa. Super. 2005). Distinctions between official 
and unofficial versions of the law matter, and thus the 
public’s right to access official versions of annotated codes 
should not be conflated with their right to access unofficial 
annotated codes. If litigants are left only with unimpeded 
access to unofficial publications of the law, they rely on 
the law at their own peril.
Not every state chooses to officially codify their law. 
For example, Virginia does not officially codify its laws, 
with the Acts of Assembly forming the “official law of 
the Commonwealth.” The Executive Committee of the 
Virginia Code Commission, http://codecommission.dls.
virginia.gov/code-of-virginia-codification-policies.shtml 
(last visited September 6, 2019). In other states, like 
Arkansas, and in this case, Georgia, states not only codify, 
but enact the codification as law. See Ark. Code. Ann. 
§ 1-2-102 (2019). When states chose to officially codify, then 
those codifications become law and the state should not be 
permitted to burden core rights of access to that law by 
interspersing copyrighted additions and then asserting 
that the whole is then copyrighted. 
11
B.		 The	Official	Code	of	Georgia	Annotated	is	the	
only	official	version	of	the	code	of	Georgia,	and	
as	a	matter	of	due	process,	residents	and	those	
affected	by	the	laws	of	Georgia	have	a	right	to	
access	it.
In Georgia’s case, the Official Code of Georgia is 
the “legal evidence of laws” as it is codified as positive 
law. OCGA § 1-1-1 (2019). The Official Code of Georgia 
Annotated is both published under the official authority 
of the state (under state seal) and as the official text of 
statutory law in Georgia. All litigants in Georgia courts 
are required, by law, to cite to the Official Code of Georgia. 
In 1982, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District 
of Georgia indicated that anyone citing the non-official 
version of the Georgia Code “will do so at his own peril 
if there is any inaccuracy in that publication or any 
discrepancy.” Georgia v. The Harrison Co., 548 F. Supp 
110, 117 (N.D.Ga 1982). The State of Georgia is not the only 
legal entity that demands access and citation to the OCGA. 
The 11th Circuit similarly requires litigants to cite to the 
OCGA, via incorporation by reference of “The Bluebook: A 
Uniform System of Citation,” which requires that litigants 
cite to the current official statutory code currently in force. 
11th Circ. R. 28-1(k). See also “The Bluebook: A Uniform 
System of Citation” 248, T.1.3 (20th Ed. 2015) (“[c]ite to 
Ga. Code Ann. (published by LexisNexis), if therein.”). 
 Indeed, the first statute in the OCGA proclaims 
the OCGA as the only official version of the statutory 
code in the state of Georgia, “The statutory portion of 
the codification of Georgia laws prepared by the Code 
Revision Commission and the Michie Company pursuant 
to a contract entered into on June 19, 1978, is enacted and 
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shall have the effect of statutes enacted by the General 
Assembly of Georgia.” OCGA § 1-1-1 (2019). The statutory 
text goes on to make clear, “The statutory portion of 
such codification shall be merged with annotations, 
captions, catchlines, history lines, editorial notes, cross-
references, indices, title and chapter analyses, and other 
materials pursuant to the contract and shall be published 
by authority of the state pursuant to such contract and 
when so published shall be known and may be cited as the 
‘Official Code of Georgia Annotated.’” Id. Thus, the statute 
makes clear two principles: First, that the OCGA is the 
only official version of the law and second, that the OCGA 
only exists as published under contract to include also 
annotations, captions, catchlines, history lines, editorial 
notes, cross-references, indices, title and chapter analysis, 
etc. Without these parts, there is no “official” version of 
the OCGA. So, for example, the free version of the Georgia 
Code that the state of Georgia makes available through 
Lexis’s website is not official, cannot be cited in court, and 
cannot be relied upon in courts by the public. Unless the 
official version of the law, the OCGA, is available for use 
without encumbrance, Georgia fails in its responsibilities 
to ensure that its citizens have access to the law. 
II. “ T H E  L AW ”  I S  I NSEPA R A BL E  FROM 
THE	OFFICIAL,	 AUTHORITATIVE	 LEGAL	
PUBLICATIONS IN WHICH IT IS PUBLISHED 
The documents that make up a published law 
are evocative because they communicate to readers 
information about three key attributes, “officialness, 
authenticity and authority,” that assure users that the 
document they are accessing is actually “the law.” Leslie A. 
Street & David R. Hansen, Who Owns the Law? Why We 
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Must Restore Public Ownership of Legal Publishing, 26 J. 
Intell. Prop. L. 205, 210 (2019). All of these characteristics 
are particularly important in the legal process. 
However, of these three characteristics, the “official” 
factor is the most critical for law libraries to continue to 
provide free, non-discriminatory, unencumbered access to 
the complete official law to their patrons. Interference with 
access to official texts comes in many forms: the process 
of licensing materials itself is frequently burdensome on 
important uses. Even just understanding and negotiating 
license terms can take significant time and expertise. 
Furthermore, access to contractual restrictions and 
high fees mean that law libraries are often not positioned 
to provide materials in their collections on the terms 
patrons need to have meaningful access to the law. These 
interferences with access stem directly from one greater 
risk, which is the focus of the present case: allowing the 
government to copyright the official law.
If copyright in an official code is allowed, the law has 
the potential to be frustratingly split up into different 
parts, further confusing the purpose of the “official” 
status and interfering with legitimate access and use. 
If the government splits official legal publications into 
protectable and unprotectable elements, this divided 
text can no longer be called “official.” If it is not official, 
it can not be used or cited by legal researchers in the 
courts. It is also disfavored for use in legal scholarship, for 
teaching legal research, and for preservation purposes. In 
addition, allowing copyright to protect these official legal 
publications can have long term ramifications for access, 
technology, and innovation. This action will restrict those 
entities - whether the present amici at law libraries, but 
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also public libraries, prison libraries, legal publishers, 
legal technology innovators, or the general public - from 
providing access to others who lack the means to comply 
with the copyright owner’s demands. When official sources 
of the law are not burdened with copyright, anyone, 
including law libraries, can take the law and make it easier 
for people to use and find. Those critical functions simply 
cannot be accomplished when the law is copyrighted.
An element of this same risk was laid out clearly in an 
earlier case involving a legal publisher. West Publishing 
previously prepared the books of the National Reporter 
System and the page citations they created became 
a fundamental requirement in legal citation. In West 
Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central, Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 
(8th Cir. 1986), Lexis, a relative newcomer to the legal 
publication market at the time, sought to create their 
own database of case law, including “star pagination,” 
which was a unique method of corresponding to each page 
number in West’s National Reporter System. Id. at 1222. 
West claimed that Lexis’s inclusion of star pagination was 
copyright infringement. Id. Initially, the Eighth Circuit 
affirmed a preliminary injunction, finding that there was 
a potential infringement. See id. at 1229. However, over 
the following decades, scholars noted that this decision 
effectively restrained the general access to the law, 
by letting one single commercial entity control the law 
through copyright, and suppressed any innovation and 
development of computer legal research technologies 
that would have aided further access to the law. See 
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Open Access in a Closed Universe, 
10 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 797 (2006). Splitting legal 
publications into protectable pagination and unprotectable 
legal decisions was the direct cause of hampering future 
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innovation in access to law. Eventually, the parties settled, 
and pagination was no longer a copyright issue. The result 
allowed Lexis and several other legal research innovators 
to enter the market without fear of litigation for making 
the law available. Id. at 823
In the present case, the Court can avoid a similar 
potential set-back for innovation in legal access and 
research technology by simply ruling that a designation 
of a law as “official” by the government makes the official 
law uncopyrightable.
Additionally, the State of Georgia, itself, mandates that 
any interpretation of the official statutes should require 
access to all the official legal materials which may include 
materials that are not merely the plain language of the 
statute. “In all interpretations of statutes, the courts shall 
look diligently for the intention of the General Assembly, 
keeping in view at all times the old law, the evil, and the 
remedy.” Ga. Code Ann. § 1-3-1 (2018). The annotations 
at issue in this case certainly aid this mandatory rule to 
discover the “intention of the General Assembly” – which 
could include notes, cross-references, and other parts of 
the official materials printed in the OCGA. The Georgia 
common law states that “[t]he cardinal or pre-eminent 
rule governing the construction of statutes is to carry into 
effect the legislative intent and purpose if that is within 
constitutional limits.” Ford Motor Co. v. Abercrombie, 
62 S.E.2d 209, 211 (1950). Again, the annotations at issue 
must be accessible to the public, so that citizens can 
discover “the effect the legislative intent and purpose” 
that is required for proper legal analysis of the statutes.
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III. C O P Y R I G H T  O F  O F F I C I A L  L E G A L 
PUBLICATIONS FRUSTRATES PRINCIPLES 
OF DUE PROCESS AND DOES NOT SERVE THE 
PURPOSES OF COPYRIGHT LAW
A.	 The	expansive	control	that	copyright	owners	
wield	 is	 incompatible	with	 the	 due	 process	
interests	of	the	public	in	access	to	and	use	of	
official	legal	publications.	
The Copyright Act grants holders of rights broad, 
exclusive rights to control reuse of their works. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 106 (2019). Sometimes referred to as a “limited monopoly,” 
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 229 (1990), those rights 
include the right of copyright owners to control how and 
when the works they own are made available to the world. 
Copyright owners, for example, have the exclusive right 
to determine when or even if to publish a work. Harper 
& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 
539 (1985). (“The right of first publication encompasses 
not only the choice whether to publish at all, but also the 
choices of when, where, and in what form first to publish 
a work”). Further, this Court has stated, “[t]he owner of 
the copyright, if he pleases, may refrain from vending or 
licensing and content himself with simply exercising the 
right to exclude others from using his property.” Fox Film 
Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
Copyright owners may also leverage their exclusive 
rights to impose significant restrictions on who may have 
access, when, for how much, and under what circumstances 
through licensing restrictions. Courts have held, for 
example, that owners of copyrightable websites or 
software may impose terms on access such as mandatory 
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arbitration, Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 
(7th Cir. 1997) and choice of forum, CompuServe, Inc. v. 
Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996). 
Indeed, Lexis has imposed in its publication of 
the unofficial, free version of the Georgia Code online 
significant contractual restrictions on access and use. 
See Terms of Use, LexisNexis. https://www.lexisnexis.
com/terms (https://perma.cc/RQ4Z-9AYN) (last visited 
September 30, 2019). Among them are that its contents 
may only be used for personal use, id. at § 2.1, “Limitations 
on Use” (“The Content on this Web Site is for your 
personal use only and not for commercial exploitation.”), 
may not be reproduced or republished “all or in part” 
except for personal purposes (apparently excluding use 
in legal filings), users must agree to surrender rights to 
pursue other unrelated claims against Lexis, id. at § 4.6 
“Intellectual Property Rights” (“You agree that you shall 
have no recourse against Provider for any alleged or actual 
infringement or misappropriation of any proprietary or 
other right in the Postings you provide to Provider”), 
users must follow specific conditions on how they can link 
to the code, id. at § 6 “Linking to this Web Site”, agree to 
have their use of the content tracked and monitored, id. at 
§ 23 “Privacy”, and agree to a governing law and forum 
in another state, § 22 “Governing Law and Jurisdiction” 
(specifying New York). Finally, Lexis asserts the rights 
to change these terms at any time with minimal notice to 
users. Id. at § 26 “Modification to terms of use.” 
These types of contractual terms are not unusual 
to find on any website, including sites offering access 
to unofficial versions of other states’ codes. See, e.g., 
Arkansas Code Public Access, https://portal.arkansas.gov/
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agency/bureau-of-legislative-research/service/arkansas-
code-search-laws-and-statutes/. But permitting copyright 
to extend to official legal publications such as the OCGA 
creates a potent and troubling combination. In that 
situation, not only can website operators such as Lexis 
impose license terms as a condition of access to their site, 
they can also act as the exclusive source for such content, 
threatening copyright infringement liability against 
organizations such as Public.Resource.Org and non-profit 
law libraries that seek to provide public access to the 
OCGA, free of these kinds of restrictions. Those liability 
threats are serious, giving the state of Georgia coercive 
control. A law library that scans and shares copies of the 
OCGA with its users faces penalties of up to $150,000 per 
work infringed. 17 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2019). That same 
library faces impoundment or destruction of any copies 
made. 17 U.S.C. § 503 (2019). And if a library user--for 
example a lawyer at a for-profit law firm--merely copied 
and used those scans and was found to have done so “for 
purposes of commercial advantage,” that law firm could 
face criminal liability. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2019). 
Because the OCGA, the whole of it and not just in part, 
is the complete legal publication to which the public must 
have access, the control that copyright law would grant 
the state is incompatible with that goal. “We cannot see 
how this aspect of copyright protection can be squared 
with the right of the public to know the law to which it is 
subject.” Bldg. Officials & Code Adm. v. Code Tech., Inc., 
628 F.2d 730, 735 (1st Cir. 1980).
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B.	 Granting	Exclusive	Rights	in	the	OCGA	Does	
Not	Serve	the	Purposes	of	Copyright
The Copyright Act ultimately aims to achieve the 
Constitutional goal to “promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. Const. Art 1, Cl. 8 Sec. 8. 
“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering 
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction 
that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is 
the best way to advance public welfare through the talents 
of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’ ” 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 
471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 
201, 219 (1954)). 
But in this case, the incentive structure that the 
Copyright Act is built on is entirely unnecessary. As a 
matter of due process, states must publish their laws. No 
additional incentive is needed because the Constitution 
demands it. While states are free to choose from a variety 
of ways to do that, whatever the method chosen, states 
must follow through on their obligation. 
Second, and more specifically to the arguments of 
Georgia and some of its amici, the copyright incentives 
for publishing law, even with ancillary research aids 
such as annotations, are not nearly as significant as are 
claimed. A brief review of legal publishing bears this out. 
Beginning with common law cases in the early nineteenth 
century, courts began to recognize that applying copyright 
protection to primary law was harmful to the public 
interest. See, e.g., Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 
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645-47 (1888); Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253-54 
(1888); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 668 (1834); 
Howell v. Miller, 91 F. 129, 138 (6th Cir. 1898); Davidson 
v. Wheelock, 27 F. 61, 62 (C.C.D. Minn. 1866); Nash v. 
Lathrop, 6 N.E. 559, 562-63 (Mass. 1886)). Later, the 
federal government codified these decisions into the U.S. 
Code, barring copyright protection for U.S. government 
works, including, any official laws. See 17 U.S.C. § 101, 
§ 105 (2019).
In Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834), this Court 
resolved a dispute between the Court’s first and second 
official reporters. See Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 63, 3 Stat. 
376 (providing for an official reporter). Henry Wheaton, 
the first reporter, published reports containing the text 
of Justices’ opinions and, additionally, his own unique 
annotations, including statements of the cases’ facts, 
procedural histories, and abstracts of the Court’s decisions. 
Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 617. After Wheaton, the second official 
reporter, Richard Peters, created his own summaries of 
the Court’s prior decisions. In doing so, Peters used some 
parts of Wheaton’s annotations. See Craig A. Joyce, The 
Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional 
Perspective on Marshall Court Ascendency, 83 Mich. 
L. Rev. 1291, 1364-1385 (1985). Wheaton sued Peters for 
copyright infringement. The Court’s decision stated that 
“no reporter has or can have any copyright in the written 
opinions delivered by this court.” Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 668. 
See also Craig Joyce, A Curious Chapter in the History of 
Judicature: Wheaton v. Peters and the Rest of the Story 
(of Copyright in the New Republic), 42 Hous. L. Rev. 325, 
351 (2005). 
Later, Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888) 
expanded the holding from Wheaton, denying copyright 
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protection for state judicial opinions. The materials at 
issue in Banks, the Ohio court’s opinions and its statements 
of the case and syllabuses, were “exclusively the work of 
the judges,” and were “not… author[ed]” by the court’s 
official reporter. Id. at 251. Therefore, applying the “public 
policy” announced in Wheaton (that “no copyright could 
... be secured in the products of the labor done by judicial 
officers in the discharge of their judicial duties,”) the Court 
held that the copying of the judge-created materials did 
not provide grounds for an infringement claim. See id. 
at 253-254. The “work done by the judges . . . is free for 
publication to all” because it “constitutes the authentic 
exposition and interpretation of the law, which[] bind[s] 
every citizen.” Id. at 253.
In the midst of all these rulings, states continued 
to publish their law and, in at least some cases, did so 
complete with ancillary research tools. For example, 
in North Carolina, the North Carolina State Supreme 
Court has now published its official reports for well over a 
century, complete with annotated headnotes. That practice 
began in the late 1800s and the commercial transaction 
was simple and free from exclusive copyright control, the 
annotator (in that case, a North Carolina Supreme Court 
justice) was paid a fixed amount, between $25 and $50 
a volume, to produce the annotations. J. Walter Clark, 
History of the Supreme Court Reports of North Carolina 
and of the Annotated Reprints, 22 N.C. 11-14 (1921). 
In many other states the creation of research aids has 
proliferated as well in the absence of exclusive control over 
the official text. For many states, commercial publishers 
have found the market lucrative enough to publish 
their own unofficial versions of the code, complete with 
22
annotations. E.g., compare West’s North Carolina Code 
Annotated (West) with North Carolina General Statutes 
(the official Lexis publication). This Court’s own reports 
are published in a number of versions, both official and 
commercial, which include copyrightable additional 
content. Compare L. Edition Preface with U.S. Reports 
Preface, with S. Ct Reports Preface.
Our contention is not that such annotations are 
uncopyrightable, or that copyright does not act as an 
incentive to promote their creation. When produced 
independently and published in unofficial publications, 
those tools may well be protectable. However, the purposes 
of Copyright are not served, nor are the interests of the 
public, when creative tools such as annotations are so 
merged with an official publication that exercise of that 
copyright prevents effective use of the official publication 
as a whole. In that case, the legally coercive power that 
copyright grants would interfere with public use and 
should yield to those interests.
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CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the court of appeals should be 
affirmed.
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APPENDIX — LIST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Law Librarians of New England (LLNE)
Law Library Association of Greater New York 
(LLAGNY)
Legal Information Preservation Alliance (LIPA)
Southeastern Association of Law Libraries (SEAALL)
Southwestern Association of Law Libraries (SWALL)
Adam Masarek 
Strategic Legal Insights Attorney 
Greenberg Traurig
Adeen Postar 
Law Library Director and Professor of Practice 
American University, Washington College of Law
Alyson Drake 
Assistant Director for Operations & Educational 
Programs; Director, Excellence in Legal Research 
Program; Adjunct Professor of Law 
Texas Tech University School of Law
Amanda Runyon 
Associate Dean and Director  
of the Biddle Law Library 
University of Pennsylvania Law School
1. Institutions are listed for identification purposes only. All 
individual signatories are participating in their individual capacity, 
not on behalf of their institutions.
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Amanda Watson 
Assistant Professor and Director  
of the O’Quinn Law Library 
University of Houston Law Center
Amy A. Emerson 
Director of the Law Library  
and Assistant Professor of Law 
Villanova University, Charles Widger  
School of Law
Amy Wharton 
Director of the Arthur J. Morris Law Library 
University of Virginia School of Law
Andrew Lang 
Reference Librarian 
University of Pennsylvania Law School
Anna Lawless-Collins 
Associate Director for Systems  
& Collection Services 
Boston University School of Law
Anne Klinefelter 
Director of the Law Library  
and Professor of Law 
University of North Carolina
Anne T. Gilliland 
Scholarly Communications Officer  
and Associate Law Librarian 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
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Ashley Krenelka Chase 
Associate Director 
Stetson University College of Law
Ashley Matthews 
Reference Librarian 
George Mason University Law Library
Benjamin Carlson 
Head of Digital Initiatives 
Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Benjamin J. Keele 
Research and Instructional Services Librarian, 
Ruth Lilly Law Library 
Indiana University, Robert H. McKinney  
School of Law
Beth Williams 
Senior Director of the Robert Crown  
Law Library & Senior Lecturer in Law 
Stanford Law School
Billie Jo Kaufman 
Interim Law Library Director  
& Visiting Professor of Law 
Mercer University School of Law
Bonita Shucha 
Associate Dean & Director of the Law Library 
University of Wisconsin Law School
Appendix
4a
Brian Barnes 
Law Library Director & Associate Professor 
Loyola University New Orleans
Brian R. Huffman 
Electronic Services Librarian 
University of Hawai‘i
Camille Broussard 
Associate Dean for Information Services and 
Director of the Mendik Law Library 
New York Law School
Candle Wester 
Associate Director for Faculty Services  
& Administration 
University of South Carolina
Cara Henley Johnson 
Library Manager 
O’Melveny
Carissa Vogel 
Associate Dean for Library Services, Director of 
the Law Library & Professor of Legal Research 
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law,  
Yeshiva University
Catherine Biondo 
Research Librarian 
Harvard Law School
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Catherine Dunn 
Director, Westminster Law Library  
& Professor in University Libraries 
University of Denver, Sturm College of Law
Charlie Amiot 
Student Services and Outreach Librarian 
University of Kentucky College of Law
Cindy Hirsch 
Reference Law Librarian 
University of Maine School of Law
Clanitra Stewart Nejdl 
Research Services Librarian and Lecturer in Law 
Vanderbilt University Law School 
Courtney Selby 
Associate Dean for Library Services  
& Associate Professor of Legal Research 
St. John’s University School of Law
Dana Rubin 
Reference Librarian 
New York University School of Law
David Isom 
Faculty Services Librarian 
University of San Diego School of Law
Dennis Kim-Prieto 
Reference Librarian 
Rutgers School of Law
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Diane M. Rodriguez  
Assistant Director  
San Francisco Law Library
Duncan Alford 
Associate Dean, Directory of the Law Library,  
and Professor of Law 
University of South Carolina School of Law
Edward T. Hart 
Assistant Dean for Law Library 
UNT Dallas College of Law
Emma Wood 
Associate Librarian 
UMass Dartmouth Law Library
Erika Cohn 
Director of the Law Library 
Associate Professor 
Saint Louis University School of Law
Faye Jones 
Director and Clinical Professor 
University of Illinois
Fred Dingledy 
Senior Reference Librarian 
The Wolf Law Library, William  
& Mary Law School
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Genevieve Tung 
Associate Director 
Rutgers Law Library
George Taoultsides 
Manager, Faculty Research and Scholarly Support 
Harvard Law School Library
Greg Lambert 
Chief Knowledge Services Officer  
Jackson Walker LLP
Heather Casey 
Int’l & Foreign Law Reference Librarian 
Georgetown University Law Center
Heidi Frostestad Kuehl 
Director of the David C. Shapiro  
Memorial Law Library 
Northern Illinois University College of Law
Jamie J. Baker 
Associate Dean & Director, Professor of Law  
Texas Tech University School of Law Library
Jane Larrington 
Associate Director & Head of Public Services 
University of San Diego Legal Research Center
Janet Sinder 
Professor of Law & Director of the Library 
Brooklyn Law School
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Jeffrey Schoerner 
Research Analyst & Librarian 
Morrison & Foerster LLP
Jennifer L. Behrens 
Associate Director for Administration  
& Scholarship 
J. Michael Goodson Law Library,  
Duke University School of Law
John Joergensen 
Senior Associate Dean for Information Services 
Rutgers Law School
John R. Beatty 
Faculty Scholarship Outreach Librarian 
Charles B. Sears Law Library, 
University at Buffalo 
Jootaek Lee 
Librarian III/ Assistant Professor  
Rutgers Law School
Julie Graves Krishnaswami  
Head of Research Instruction 
Yale Law School
Julie Kimbrough 
Acting Director of the Law Library  
& Clinical Assistant Professor of Law 
Kathrine R. Everett Law Library 
University of North Carolina School of Law
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Kate Irwin-Smiler 
Reference Librarian 
Professional Center Library, Wake Forest 
University School of Law
Kathleen Delaurenti 
Head Librarian 
Peabody Institute
Kelly Leong 
Head of Reference 
Maloney Law Library,  
Fordham University School of Law
Kelly Reynolds 
Law Reference Librarian 
University of Oregon
Ken Rodriguez 
Reference & Intellectual Property  
Law Librarian; Professorial Lecturer in Law 
The George Washington University  
Law School, Burns Law Library
Kein Garewal 
Associate Director of Collections 
Harvard Law School
Kristina J. Alayan 
Law Library Director & Assistant Professor of Law 
Howard University School of Law
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Laureen C. Urquiaga 
Digital Services Librarian 
Howard W. Hunter Law Library
Lee F. Peoples 
Associate Dean of Library & Technology 
Frederick Charles Hicks Professor of Law 
Oklahoma City University School of Law
Lisa A. Goodman 
Executive Professor and Director  
of the Law Library 
Texas A&M University School of Law
Louis M. Rosen 
Reference Librarian, Associate  
Professor of Law Library 
Barry University School of Law
Lu Tuan Nguyen 
Reference Librarian 
Orange County Public Law Library
Margaret K Maes 
Executive Director, Retired 
Legal Information Preservation Alliance
Mari Cheney 
Assistant Director, Research and Instruction 
Lewis & Clark Law School, Boley Law Library
Appendix
11a
Mariah Ford 
Research Services Librarian  
Vanderbilt Law School
Mark Williams 
Head of Collections 
Vanderbilt University Law School 
Mary Beth Parker 
Associate Director of Operations & Collections 
Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad 
College of Law, Panza Maurer Law Library
Mary Jenkins 
Director, Research Solutions 
Accufile
Mary Rumsey 
Reference and Instructional Services Librarian 
Willamette University College of Law
Mary S. Searles 
Law Librarian/Director 
The John W. King New Hampshire Law Library
Melinda Kent 
Manager, Research Services 
Harvard Law School Library
Melissa J Bernstein 
Director and Professor James E. Faust  
Law Library 
University of Utah, College of Law
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Michael Chiorazzi 
Associate dean for Information Services 
University of Miami School of Law
Michelle Hook Dewey 
Legal Research Services Manager  
BakerHostetler
Michelle Trumbo 
Executive Director 
Legal Information Preservation Alliance
Michelle Wu 
Associate Dean for Library Services  
and Professor of Law 
Georgetown Law
Mitchell Silverman 
Independent Legal Education Consultant 
Mitchell L. Silverman, Infoneed Research
Patrick J. Charles 
Library Director & Associate Professor of Law 
Gonzaga University School of Law
Paul Gatz 
Reference Librarian and Adjunct Professor 
The Ohio State University
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Pauline M. Aranas 
Associate Dean, John Stauffer Charitable Trust 
Chief Information Officer, Director of the Law 
Library, and Adjunct Professor of Law 
University of Southern California  
Gould School of Law
Phillip Thomas Gragg 
Associate Dean for Library and Information 
Services and Associate Professor of Law 
California Western School of Law
Pia M. Hunter 
Teaching Assistant Professor 
Albert E. Jenner, Jr. Law Library, 
University of Illinois College of Law
Rachel Green 
Faculty Services Librarian 
UCLA School of Law
Raquel J. Gabriel 
Professor of Law & Director of the Law Library 
City University of New York (CUNY) School of Law
Richard Leiter 
Director of the Schmid Law Library 
University of Nebraska
Rick Goheen 
Asst. Dean for the LaValley Law Library  
& Assoc. Professor of Law 
University of Toledo
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Robert M. Truman 
Associate Dean and Director 
Boley Law Library, Lewis & Clark Law School
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